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PART 1: THE DIGITAL HUMANITIES AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN  
 
As Mark Poster emphasized some time ago, one of the interesting things about computer 
science is that it was the first case where “a scientific field was established that focuses on a 
machine” and not on an aspect of nature or culture, as is the case with the physical, life and 
social sciences. More interesting still is the way Poster was able to demonstrate the relation to 
this machine in computer science is actually one of misrecognition, with the computer 
occupying “the position of the imaginary” and being “inscribed with transcendent status.” His 
argument was that “since Computer Science found its first identity through its relation to the 
computer, that identity remains part of the disciplinary protocol of the field, even if the actual 
object, the computer, changes significantly, even unrecognizably, in the course of the years” 
(Poster 1990, 147).1 However, it is a misidentification on the part of computer science that 
also has significant implications for any response we might make to the so-called 
computational turn in the humanities (Berry 2012, 11; boyd and Crawford 2011).  
 
The latter term has been adopted to refer to the process whereby techniques and 
methodologies drawn from computer science and related fields - including interactive 
information visualization, science visualization, image processing, geospatial representation, 
statistical data analysis, network analysis, and the mining, aggregation, management and 
manipulation  of data - are used to create new ways of approaching and understanding texts in 
the humanities. Indeed, thanks to increases in computer processing power and its affordability 
over the last few years, along with the enormous amount of cultural material now available in 
digital form, number-crunching software is currently being applied to millions of humanities 
texts in this way.  
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It is not my intention here to equate this computational turn with the digital humanities per 
se. Although the latter is sometimes known as humanities computing, or as a transition 
between the “traditional humanities” and humanities computing (Meeks 2010), what has 
come to be called the digital humanities and this computational turn in the humanities should 
not be perceived as being equivalent to one another.  Instead, I want to emphasize the 
importance of maintaining a distinction between them, especially if we are to develop a 
rigorous understanding of what the humanities can become in an era of networked digital 
information machines.  So far (and as we shall see in Part II), the traffic in this computational 
turn has been predominately one-way. As the term implies, it has been mainly concerned with 
exploring what direct, practical uses computer science can be put to in the humanities, in 
terms of performing operations on sets, flows and networks of data so large that, in the words 
of the NEH et al. Digging Into Data Challenge, “they can be processed only using computing 
resources and computational methods” (2009).  Witness Dan Cohen and Fred Gibbs’ text 
mining of “the 1,681,161 books that were published in English in the UK in the long 
nineteenth-century,” and Lev Manovich and the Software Studies Initiative’s use of “digital 
image analysis and new visualisation techniques” to study “20,000 pages of Science and 
Popular Science magazines” (D. Cohen 2010a; Manovich 2012a, 467). Just as interesting as 
what computer science has to offer the humanities, however, is the question of what the 
humanities - in both their digital and traditional guises (assuming the two can be 
distinguished in this way, which is by no means certain, as we shall see) - have to offer 
computer science; and, beyond that, what the humanities themselves can bring to the 
understanding of computing and the shaping of the digital. Do the humanities really need to 
draw quite so heavily on computer science to develop a sense of what they can be in the age 
of new media and big data? Together with a computational turn in the humanities, might we 
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not also benefit from more of a humanities - and, as I shall point to in my conclusion, perhaps 
even post-humanities - turn in our understanding of the computational and the digital?  
 
Poster’s argument about the relation to the machine in computer science being one of 
misrecognition takes on added importance in the light of such questions. It suggests that as a 
field computer science is not necessarily the best equipped to understand itself and its own 
founding object, let alone help those in the humanities with their relation to computing and 
the digital. In fact, counter-intuitive as it may seem, if what we are looking for is an 
appreciation of what the humanities can become in an era of networked digital information 
machines and data-driven scholarship, we may be better advised seeking assistance 
elsewhere, other than primarily with computing science and engineering, science and 
technology, or even science in general. One almost hesitates to suggest this in the current 
political climate when government, research council and private funding in the UK is focused 
on the STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) - although it may 
be important to do so for just this reason - but perhaps we should turn to the literary critics, 
philosophers and theorists of the humanities right from the start.  
 
Thirty years ago the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard showed how science, lacking the 
resources to legitimate itself as true, had, since its beginnings with Plato, relied for its 
legitimacy on precisely the kind of knowledge it did not even consider to be knowledge: non-
scientific narrative knowledge. Specifically, science legitimated itself by producing a 
discourse called philosophy. It was philosophy’s role to generate a discourse of legitimation 
for science. Lyotard proceeded to define as modern any science that legitimated itself in this 
way by means of a metadiscourse that explicitly appealed to a grand narrative of some sort: 
the life of the spirit, the Enlightenment, progress, modernity, the emancipation of humanity, 
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the realisation of the Idea. What makes Lyotard’s analysis so significant with respect to the 
emergence of the digital humanities and the computational turn is that his ambition was not to 
position philosophy as being able to tell us as much, if not more, about science than science 
itself could. It was rather to emphasize that, in a process of transformation that had been 
taking place since at least the end of the 1950s, such long-standing metanarratives of 
legitimation had themselves become obsolete. So what happens to science when the 
philosophical metanarratives that legitimate it are no longer credible? Lyotard’s answer, at 
least in part, was that science (or a certain stabilized, ideologically “accepted” version of it) 
was increasing its connection to society, especially the instrumentality and functionality of 
society (as opposed to a notion of public service, say) (Lyotard 1986, 63).2 Science was doing 
so by helping to legitimate and “augment” the power of States, companies and multinational 
corporations by optimizing the “global relationship between input and output,” between what 
is put into the social system and what is got out of it, in order to get more from less (46, 11).  
 
It is at this point that we return directly to the subject of computing. For Lyotard, writing in 
1979, technological transformations in research and the transmission of acquired learning in 
the most highly developed societies, including the widespread use of computers and 
databases and the “miniaturization and commercialization of machines,” were already in the 
process of exteriorizing knowledge in relation to the “knower” (4). He demonstrates how this 
general transformation and exteriorization is leading to a major alteration in the status and 
nature of knowledge: away from a concern with “the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc”. (44), 
with ideals (48), with knowledge as an end in itself (5, 50); and precisely toward a concern 
with improving the social system’s performance, its efficiency (xxiv). Thirty years later we 
do indeed find numerous discourses in the sciences taken up with exteriorizing knowledge 
and information in order to achieve “the best possible performance” by eliminating delays 
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and inefficiencies, and by solving technical problems (77). Thus we have John Houghton’s 
2009 study showing that the open access academic publishing model championed most 
vociferously in the sciences is actually the most cost effective mechanism for scholarly 
publishing. Others meanwhile have detailed the increases open access publishing and the 
related software make possible in the amount of research material that can be published, 
searched and stored, the number of people who can access it, the impact of that material, the 
range of its distribution, and the speed and ease of reporting and information retrieval – 
facilitating what one of the leaders of the open access movement has referred to as “better 
metrics” (Suber 2009). Even the data created in the course of scientific research is being 
made freely and openly available on the Internet for others to use, analyse and build upon. 
Known as Open Data, this initiative is motivated by more than an awareness data is the main 
research output in many fields. In the words of another of the leading advocates for open 
access, publishing data online on an open basis bestows it with a “vastly increased utility:” 
digital data sets are “easily passed around;” they are “more easily reused,” reanalysed and 
checked for accuracy and validity; and they contain more “opportunities for educational and 
commercial exploitation” (Swan 2009).  
 
In a further move in this direction, all seven Public Library of Science (PLoS) open access 
journals now provide a broad range of article level metrics and indicators relating to usage 
data on an open basis. PLoS has positioned this programme as enabling science scholars to 
assess “research articles on their own merits rather than on the basis of the journal (and its 
impact factor) where the work happens to be published,” and they encourage readers to carry 
out their own analyses of this open data (Patterson 2009). Yet it is difficult not to see article-
level metrics as also being part of the wider process of transforming knowledge and learning 
into “quantities of information;” quantities that are produced more to be exchanged, marketed 
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and sold – for example, by individual academics to their departments, institutions, funders 
and governments in the form of indicators of “quality” and “impact” - than for their “’use-
value’” (Lyotard 1986, 4, 5).  
 
Certainly, the current requirement to have visibility, to show up in the metrics, to be 
measurable, encourages researchers to publish as much and as frequently as they can. 
Consequently, the peer-reviewed academic journal article has been positioned by some as 
having now assumed “a single central value, not that of bringing something new to the field 
but that of assessing the person’s research, with a view to hiring, promotion, funding, and, 
more and more, avoiding termination” (Kempf 2010). In such circumstances “it is not hard to 
visualize learning circulating along the same lines as money, instead of for its ‘educational’ 
value or political (administrative, diplomatic, military) importance” (Lyotard 1986, 6). Just as 
money has become a source of virtual value and speculation in the era of American-led 
neoliberal global finance capital, so too has education, research and publication.  
 
Of course, such discourses around openness, efficiency and utility are not confined to the 
sciences – or even the university. There are also wider political initiatives, dubbed ‘Open 
Government’, with both the Labour and the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
administrations in the UK making a great display of freeing government information. The 
former implemented the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act in 2000. In January 2010 Labour 
also launched a website (www.data.gov.uk) expressly dedicated to the release of 
governmental data sets; a website the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition has continued 
to make extensive use of. So much so the latter established an Open Data Institute in 2012 
expressly designed to build on the demand for open data.  
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Nor is this a phenomenon restricted to the UK: if anything the situation is even more extreme 
in the United States. Here, throughout his initial presidential election campaign Barack 
Obama repeatedly promised to make government more open. He followed this up by issuing 
a memorandum on transparency the very first day after he became President, committing to 
make openness one of ‘the touchstones of this presidency’” (Obama in Stolberg 2009). How 
much he has honoured this commitment is questionable, the Obama administration having 
since withdrawn the bulk of funding from the US open government website www.data.gov. 
Nevertheless, whereas in the UK a serving Secretary of State (Mo Mowlam) could conceal a 
malignant tumour from both the public and the Prime Minister, such is the emphasis on 
freedom of information in the US that knowledge of President Obama’s resting heart rate (56 
beats a minute), blood pressure (105/62) and cholesterol level (54.mmol/litre) is publically 
available (Crippen 2010, 2).  
 
From a liberal perspective, freeing publicly funded and acquired information and data – 
whether gathered directly in the process of census collection, or indirectly as part of other 
activities (crime, healthcare, transport, schools and accident statistics) – is indeed seen as 
helping society to perform more efficiently. Oopenness is said to play a key role in increasing 
citizen trust, participation and involvement in democracy, and in fact government, as access 
to information – such as that needed to intervene in public policy – is no longer restricted 
either to the state or to those corporations, institutions, organizations and individuals who 
have sufficient money and power to acquire it for themselves. But neoliberal conservatives 
also support making the data freely and openly available to businesses and the public on the 
grounds it provides a means of achieving what Lyotard referred to as the “best possible 
input/output equation” (46). Such openness and communicative transparency is perceived as 
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ensuring greater value for (taxpayers’) money, helping to eliminate corruption, enabling costs 
to be distributed more effectively, and increasing not just choice, competiveness and 
accountability, but enterprise, creativity and innovation too. Companies are able to build new 
businesses based on the use of public data, for example. In fact, McKinsey Global Institute 
suggests “analyzing large data sets—so-called big data—will become a key basis of 
competition, underpinning new waves of productivity growth, innovation, and consumer 
surplus” (2011).   
 
To what extent do such developments cast the computational turn in the humanities in a 
rather different light to the celebratory data-fetishism that has dominated much of this rapidly 
emerging field? Is the direct, practical use of techniques and methodologies drawn from 
computer science and various fields related to it, including management, business and design, 
here too helping to produce a major alteration in the status and nature of knowledge?   
In what seems to be almost the reverse of the situation we saw Lyotard describe, many of 
those in the humanities do now appear to be looking increasingly to science (and technology 
and mathematics) – if not always computer science specifically - to provide their research 
with a degree of legitimacy. This includes some of the field’s most radical thinkers. Witness 
Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s appeal to “the history of modern chemistry on the one hand, and the 
most recent cognitive theories on the other,” for confirmation of the compositionist 
philosophical hypothesis: “There is no object, no existent, and no person: only aggregates, 
temporary atomic compositions, figures that the human eye perceives as stable but that are 
indeed mutational, transient, frayed and indefinable” (Berardi 2009, 121, 120). It is this 
hypothesis, derived from Democritus, that Bifo sees as underpinning the methods of both the 
schizoanalysis of Deleuze and Guattari and the Italian Autonomist Theory on which his own 
compositionist philosophy is based.  
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This scientific turn in the humanities has been attributed by some to a crisis of confidence 
brought about, if not by the lack of credibility of the humanities’ metanarratives of 
legitimation exactly, then at least in part by the “imperious attitude” of the sciences. It is an 
attitude that has led the latter to colonize the humanists’ space in the form of biomedicine, 
neuroscience, theories of cognition and so on (Kagan 2009, 227). From this perspective, the 
turn toward computing appears as just the latest manifestation of, and response to, this crisis 
of confidence in the humanities. Can we go even further, however, and ask: is it evidence that 
certain parts of the humanities are attempting to increase their connection to society; 3 and to 
the efficiency, instrumentality and functionality of society especially? What are we to make 
of the fact that such a turn toward computing is gaining momentum at a time when the UK 
government is emphasizing the importance of the STEMs and withdrawing support and 
funding for the humanities? No doubt it would require a long, complex, multi-faceted 
analysis that goes some way back in history to answer this question.  Still, one of the reasons 
all this is happening now may indeed be due to the fact that the humanities, like the sciences 
themselves, are under pressure from government, business, management, industry and 
increasingly the media to prove they provide value for money in instrumental, functional, 
performative terms.  Can the interest in computing therefore be seen as a strategic decision on 
the part of some of those in the humanities? After all, one can get funding from the likes of 
Google (D. Cohen 2010a). In fact, in the summer of 2010 “Google awarded $1 million to 
professors doing digital humanities research” (P. Cohen 2010).  
 
At the very least, a question can be raised regarding the extent to which the take up of 
practical techniques and approaches from computing science is providing some areas of the 
humanities with a means of defending and refreshing themselves in an era of global economic 
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crisis and severe cuts to higher education, through the transformation of their knowledge and 
learning into (ideologically acceptable) quantities of information – deliverables. But the 
computational turn can also be positioned as an event created to justify such a move on the 
part of certain elements within the humanities (Frabetti 2010). In which case it might be 
advisable to use a different term than digital humanities if we do not wish to simply go along 
with the current movement away from what remains resistant to a general culture of 
measurement and calculation. For the idea of both the computational turn and the digital 
humanities seems to imply that, thanks to the development of a new generation of powerful 
computers and digital tools, the humanities have somehow become digital, or are in the 
process of becoming digital (Frabetti 2010).  Yet one of the things I am attempting to show 
here by drawing on the thought of Lyotard and others is that the digital is not something that 
can now be added to the humanities - for the simple reason that the (supposedly pre-digital) 
humanities can be seen to have already had an understanding of, and engagement with, 
computing and the digital.  
 
Certainly, something that is particularly noticeable about many instances of this turn to data-
driven scholarship - especially after decades when the humanities have been heavily marked 
by a variety of critical theories: Marxist, psychoanalytic, post-colonialist, post-Marxist - is 
just how difficult they find it to understand computing and the digital as much more than 
tools, techniques and resources, and thus how naive and lacking in meaningful critique they 
often are (Higgen 2010; Liu 2012). Witness the emphasis on making the data not only visible 
but visual, even aesthetic. Stefanie Posavec’s Literary Organism, which visualizes the 
structure of Part One of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road as a tree, provides an oft cited example 
of this aestheticization of data (2013).  
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There is a long history of critical engagement within the humanities with ideas of the visual, 
the image, the spectacle, the spectator and so on: not just in critical theory, but also in literary 
studies, cultural studies, women’s studies, queer studies, media studies, film and television 
studies. Such a history of critical engagement stretches back to Guy Debord’s influential 
1967 work, The Society of the Spectacle, and beyond. For instance, in his introduction to a 
1995 book, Visual Display: Culture Beyond Appearances, Peter Wollen writes that an excess 
of visual display within culture has “the effect of concealing the truth of the society that 
produces it, providing the viewer with an unending stream of images that might best be 
understood, not simply detached from a real world of things, as Debord implied, but as 
effacing any trace of the symbolic, condemning the viewer to a world in which we can see 
everything but understand nothing—allowing us viewer-victims, in Debord’s phrase, only ‘a 
random choice of ephemera’" (1995, 9). It can come as something of a surprise, then, to 
discover that this humanities tradition in which ideas of the visual are engaged critically 
appears to have had comparatively little impact on much of the current enthusiasm for data 
visualization that is so prominent an aspect of the turn toward data-intensive scholarship.  
 
Of course, this (at times explicit) repudiation of criticality could be viewed as part of what 
makes certain aspects of the digital humanities so intriguing at the moment. Exponents of the 
computational turn are endeavouring to avoid conforming to accepted (and often moralistic) 
conceptions of politics that have been decided in advance, including those that see it only in 
terms of power, ideology, race, ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality and so on. Refusing to “go 
through the motions of a critical avant-garde” (Latour 2004), they are responding to what is 
perceived as a fundamentally new cultural situation, and the challenge it represents to our 
traditional methods of studying culture, by avoiding such conventional gestures, and 
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experimenting with the development of fresh methods and approaches for the humanities 
instead.4  
 
There may well be a degree of “relief in having escaped the culture wars of the 1980s” - for 
those in the United States especially - as a result of this move “into the space of 
methodological work” (Croxall, response to Higgen  2010) and what Tom Scheinfeldt dubs 
“the post-theoretical age” (P. Cohen 2010). The problem is, however, without such reflexive 
critical thinking and theories many of those whose work forms part of this computational turn 
find it difficult to articulate exactly what the point of what they are doing is, as Scheinfeldt 
readily acknowledges (Scheinfeldt 2010).  
 
Interestingly, Scheinfeldt suggests that the problem of theory, or the lack of it, may actually 
be a matter of scale and timing: 
 
It expects something of the scale of humanities scholarship which I’m not sure is true 
anymore: that a single scholar—nay, every scholar—working alone will, over the 
course of his or her lifetime ... make a fundamental theoretical advance to the field. 
Increasingly, this expectation is something peculiar to the humanities.  ... it required 
the work of a generation of mathematicians and observational astronomers, gainfully 
employed, to enable the eventual “discovery” of Neptune… Since the scientific 
revolution, most theoretical advances play out over generations, not single careers. 
There is just too much lab work to be done and data to analyzed for each person to be 
pointed at the end point. (Scheinfeldt, 2012b)  
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Notice how theory is again being marginalized in favour of an emphasis on STEM, and the 
adoption of expectations and approaches associated with mathematicians and astronomers in 
particular.  
 
None of this is to deny we should experiment with the new tools, methods and materials that 
digital media technologies create and make possible, including those drawn from computer 
science, in order to bring new forms of Foucauldian dispositifs, or what Bernard Stiegler 
refers to as hypomnemata (that is mnemonics)  into play (2010, 167-168).  Still, there is 
something intriguing about the way in which many defenders of the turn toward 
computational tools and methods in the humanities evoke a sense of time in relation to 
theory.  
 
Take the argument – apparent in the emphasis Scheinfeldt places on scale and timing - that 
critical and self-reflexive theoretical questions about the use of digital tools and data-led 
methodologies should be deferred for the time being, lest they have the effect of strangling at 
birth what could turn out to be a very different form of humanities research before it has had 
a chance to properly take shape. Viewed in isolation, it can be difficult, if not impossible, to 
decide whether this particular kind of limitless postponement is serving as an alibi for a naive 
and rather superficial form of scholarship (Meeks 2010); or whether it is indeed acting as a 
responsible political or ethical opening to the (heterogeneity and incalculability of the) future, 
including the future of the humanities. After all, the suggestion is that now is not the right 
time to be making any such decision or judgement, since we cannot yet know how humanists 
will eventually come to use these tools and data, and thus what data-driven scholarship may 
or may not turn out to be capable of, critically, politically, theoretically.  
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This argument would be more convincing as a responsible political or ethical call to leave the 
question of the use of digital tools and data-led methodologies in the humanities open, 
however, if it were the only sense in which time was evoked in relation to theory in this 
context. Significantly, it is not. As we have seen, advocates for the computational turn do so 
in a number of other and often competing senses too:  
 
a) That the time of theory is over, in the sense a particular historical period or moment 
has now ended (for example, that of the culture wars of the 1980s);  
b) That the time for theory is over, in the sense it is now the time for methodology 
(Scheinfeldt 2012);  
c) That the time to return to theory, or for theory to (re-)emerge in some new, 
unpredictable form which represents a fundamental breakthrough or advance, 
although possibly on its way, has not arrived yet, and cannot necessarily be expected 
to do so for some time (given that “most theoretical advances play out over 
generations”) (Scheinfeldt, response to D. Cohen 2010a).  
 
All of which gives a very different inflection to the view of theoretical critique as being at 
best inappropriate, and at worst harmful to data-driven scholarship. Even a brief glance at the 
history of theory’s reception in the English-speaking world is sometimes enough to reveal 
that those who announce its time has not yet come, or is already over, that theory is in decline 
or even dead, and that we now live in a post-theoretical world, are more often than not 
endeavouring to keep it at a temporal distance. Positioning their work as either pre- or post-
theory in this way in effect grants them permission to continue with their preferred techniques 
and methodologies for studying culture relatively uncontested (rather than having to ask 
rigorous, critical and self-reflexive questions about their own practices and justifications for 
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them). Placed in this wider context, far from helping to keep the question concerning the use 
of digital tools and data-led methodologies in the humanities open, the rejection of critical-
theoretical ideas as untimely can be seen as both moralizing and conservative.  
 
In saying this I am reiterating an argument made by Wendy Brown in the sphere of political 
theory. Yet can a similar case not be made with regard to the computational turn in the 
humanities, to the effect that the “rebuff of critical theory as untimely provides the core 
matter for the affirmative case for it?” 5 Theory is vital from this point of view, not for 
conforming to accepted conceptions of political critique that see it primarily in terms of 
power, ideology, race, ethnicity, gender, class, and so on, but “to contest the very sense of 
time invoked to declare critique untimely” (Brown 2005, 4). 
 
 
PART 2: THE CULTURAL ANALYTICS OF LEV MANOVICH AND THE 
SOFTWARE STUDIES INITIATIVE 
 
To think further and in more detail about the relation between data-driven scholarship, theory 
and critique, let us turn to what has frequently been positioned as one of the most interesting 
and influential examples of the computational turn: the  Cultural Analytics of  Lev Manovich 
and  The Software Studies Initiative .6 For Manovich, it is not simply a matter of the 
widespread use of computers and databases exteriorizing knowledge in relation to the 
knower; given that in 2012 there were “2.2 billion email users worldwide… 634 million 
websites… 2.7 billion likes on Facebook every day,” it is a case of there now being so much 
cultural production in the twenty-first century it can no longer be known by the knower 
(Schroeder 2013). Manovich sees the sheer scale and dynamics of this new media landscape 
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as presenting the accepted means of studying culture, the kind of theories, concepts and 
methods appropriate to producing close readings of the content of a relatively small number 
of texts that were dominant for so much of the twentieth century, with a significant practical 
and conceptual challenge. In the past, “cultural theorists and historians could generate 
theories and histories based on small data sets:” American literature of the 1960s, for 
example, or the films of Alfred Hitchcock. “But how can we track ‘global digital cultures,’” 
he asks, “with their billions of cultural objects, and hundreds of millions of contributors?” 
(Manovich  2009a)  
 
Manovich’s solution to this data deluge is to turn to the very computers, databases, software 
and vast amounts of born-digital networked cultural content that are creating the problem in 
the first place, and to use them to help develop new methods and approaches adequate to the 
task at hand. This is where Cultural Analytics comes into play. While scientists, businesses, 
and government agencies are using data analytics to extract not just figures from big data but 
also useful ideas for action, the “key idea of Cultural Analytics is the use of computers to 
automatically analyze cultural artefacts in visual media, extracting large numbers of features 
that characterize their structure and content” (Manovich, 2009c). And what is more to do so 
not just with regard to the culture of the past, but also with that of the present, including real-
time data flows.  
 
What makes Manovich and the Software Studies Initiative’s Cultural Analytics research so 
interesting is the way it is clearly striving to open the humanities to some of the new 
disciplines, frameworks and forms of knowledge digital media technologies may make 
possible:  
 
18 
 
What will happen when humanists start using interactive visualizations as a standard 
tool in their work, the way many scientists do already? If slides made possible art 
history, and if a movie projector and video recorder enabled film studies, what new 
cultural disciplines may emerge out of the use of interactive visualization and data 
analysis of large cultural data sets? (Manovich 2009/2012b ) 
 
And, to be sure, Cultural Analytics is able to demonstrate some of the things software tools 
and quantitative analysis can do in this respect, particularly when it comes to identifying 
patterns, relationships, trends, tendencies and structures in large sets of cultural data - or 
variations in, disruptions of, and exceptions to those patterns and trends. Information such as 
the colour “palettes of films as a whole,” “the individual or group aesthetic impression of 
what typifies the ‘essential’ character of a film and... which shots or scenes best correspond to 
that assessment,” and which can be visualized but not necessarily described in language 
(Douglass 2009). Interactive visualizations of this kind may even have the potential to open 
up new directions in the analysis of film in terms of patterns, rhythms, and dynamic flows 
that change over time. Still, “visualisation only shows patterns – it’s up to the researcher to 
interpret them as meaningful” (Manovich 2010a).  Significantly, the role of actually 
interpreting such patterns as meaningful, let alone reflecting critically on the practice of doing 
so  (how does the ascription of meaning to the underlying cultural patterns and relationships 
revealed by visualization avoid becoming some kind of twenty-first century new media 
formalism/structuralism?)  is one Manovich frequently downplays, if not indeed 
marginalizes, from his accounts of Cultural Analytics, preferring to leave it to other 
researchers to fulfil at some unspecified point in the future. “What we need is to have as 
many people as possible start using these tools -- and then we will see what will emerge” 
(Manovich 2008).  Consequently, what Cultural Analytics is not so clearly able to 
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demonstrate – at least not yet anyway – is precisely the kind of rigorous critical interpretation 
and self-reflection that might actually open up new directions in the analysis of cinema, say, 
and turn all this data and information into a new argument or hypothesis about culture. It is 
often difficult to get a sense of what the resulting cultural criticism would look like from 
Manovich’s descriptions of Cultural Analytics.  
 
To raise this issue is not to imply some forms of quantitative literary and cultural analysis or 
cultural analytics cannot be used critically and self-reflexively to help explore and research 
the vast, networked nature of twenty-first century post-industrial society – and even 
creatively analyze and resist culturally dominant discourses, including some of those 
associated with openness, efficiency, instrumentality, transparency and so forth. A large part 
of the appeal of Manovich’s particular enactment of the turn toward computing and data-
driven scholarship (and this is partly why I have chosen to focus on his account of Cultural 
Analytics) lies with the way he does continue to talk about asking “larger theoretical 
questions about cultures (as opposed to more narrow pragmatic questions” asked by 
professional fields associated with science, business and government) (Manovich, 2009a). 
Manovich acknowledges that, with Cultural Analytics, he wants to create tools “to enable 
new type [sic] of cultural criticism and analysis appropriate for the era of cultural 
globalization and user-generated media” (ibid.). So, contra boyd and Crawford’s (2011) 
characterization of many debates over big data, Manovich is not suggesting “other forms of 
analysis can be sidelined by production lines of numbers, privileged as having a direct line to 
raw knowledge,” and that consequently we give up on critique and on asking theoretical 
questions. Nevertheless, it is surprisingly hard to find actual instances where Manovich 
articulates in a rigorous fashion exactly how Cultural Analytics can be used to develop and 
perform such a new form of cultural criticism. 
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Take, as a very brief example - but one Manovich regularly refers to in talks and lectures, and 
which for all its brevity is nonetheless indicative of the general problem - his use of Cultural 
Analytics to study the history of art. What Manovich does in this respect is take a set of 
canonical images illustrative of the development of art over a particular period of time – from 
“mid-19th century, realism, through impressionism, post-impressionism, leading up to early 
20th century geometric abstraction”– and automatically extract their different visual qualities 
by computer (Manovich 2009d).  This then enables him to show how the resulting data, 
arranged into graphs, to all intents and purposes corresponds to the history of art as it is 
conventionally understood. So, as far as the pace of cultural change and revolution is 
concerned, “around 1870, things are going to get faster, as you have the development from 
realism to modernism. Then around 1905, the speed… increases quite dramatically” (ibid.). 
Yet how interesting is it that Cultural Analytics should more or less confirm the accepted 
history of art, rather than offer a significant challenge to that history, or even address it 
particularly critically (Shanken  2009)? And how surprising is it, given that the study is based 
on canonical images taken from that same history?  
 
Far from enabling him to avoid having to answer the kinds of questions often associated with 
the close reading of a relatively small number of texts that were dominant for so much of the 
twentieth century, could Manovich’s Cultural Analytics approach to art history not here be 
said to be based on the assumption that such apparently untimely questions have already been 
answered - to the extent they now appear to be relatively unimportant and unproblematic 
issues, if not a given? To put things in what are merely the most obvious of terms: what is 
being understood and brought together as illustrative of the artistic canon? What is left 
outside:  perhaps because it is not perceived as art, or as a canonical image, or because it does 
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not belong to this particular version of art history? How are all these selections and decisions 
being made? Who (or what) by? With what authority and legitimacy?  (And this is before we 
address technical issues such as those concerned with how accurately the colours, tones and 
intensities of a variety of different paintings can be reproduced and compared on a digital 
screen, let alone across the HIperSpace display wall of 70x30 inch monitors Manovich uses 
[Manovich 2010b; Shanken, 2009].)  
 
Even if Manovich is merely using art history as one of many examples to demonstrate what 
Cultural Analytics is potentially capable of with regard to broadening the “canon of cultural 
material under consideration by humanities scholars” and analyzing large sets of cultural 
data, now and in the future, a number of questions remain (Burdick et al 2012, 41). For 
instance, the Cultural Analytics page of the Software Studies Initiative’s website describes 
one of the key goals of Cultural Analytics research as being to “create much more inclusive 
cultural histories and analysis - ideally taking into account all available cultural objects 
created in particular cultural area and time period” (Manovich 2009/2012b). Yet what would 
all the available cultural objects created in a particular cultural area and time period be? What 
theory of the cultural object - or cultural area and time period, or indeed culture - is being 
used to underpin such research? And, again, what types of analysis and questions are being 
privileged? How are all these images and objects being structured for retrieval and analysis? 
What is being left out? (At the very least everything that cannot be so digitized and structured 
presumably?) And how do such (non)decisions affect the analysis?  
 
For the most part, rather than taking the time to reflect rigorously on such questions and 
seriously engage with them, Manovich’s Cultural Analytics in effect abstracts the (large sets 
of) visual cultural objects it chooses to work with from the particular historical, social and 
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cultural contexts, practices and sets of relations associated with their production, mediation, 
interpretation and consumption (the law, politics, the market economy, and so forth), to focus 
primarily on the formal aspects of their contents and structure of composition (e.g. the color 
saturation of Time magazine covers). Cultural Analytics proceeds to treat these (large sets of) 
cultural objects and artefacts as if they constitute more or less identifiable, stable, self-
identical, some might say essentialist forms, which can be analyzed automatically by using 
“image processing and computer vision techniques” in order “to generate numerical 
descriptions of their structure and content,” thus transforming these (sets of) cultural objects 
into data (Manovich, 2009a). This then allows the Cultural Analytics researcher to perform 
various “new” kinds of operations and procedures borrowed from computing science and 
software using these numerical descriptions, such as searching, sorting, copying, combining, 
comparing, correlating, visualizing, graphing, sharing and remixing. In doing so, however, 
Manovich’s Cultural Analytics takes too little account of the constitutive force of its own 
analysis: the way in which, just as critical theory tells us that the reader of a text is constituted 
as a subject in and by the very process of reading, so the (large sets of) objects of Cultural 
Analytics research do not exist outside of and prior to the analysis in any simple or 
straightforward sense, but are performatively constructed by it in the very process of being 
analysed, translated into data and operated on, regardless of whether this is done 
automatically or not.  What can variously be understood in terms of the irreducible violence, 
ambiguity, fictionality or, following the philosopher and quantum physicist Karen Barad 
(2007), intra-action that is inherent to all analysis, interpretation and mediation, the 
implications of which the last five decades of critical theory have spent a good deal of time 
endeavouring to understand and think through: hence theory’s interest in writing, literature, 
poesis and so on.  
 
23 
 
Indeed, would it be going too far to suggest that, in his desire to develop what he refers to as 
“new paradigm for the study, teaching and public presentation” of cultural artefacts, 
Manovich has neglected to pay sufficient attention to taking on and assuming (rather than 
merely repeating and acting out), the implications of one of the major insights regarding 
language and technology acquired from twentieth-century theory (2009b)? It is a lesson the 
latter has been teaching us since at least the work of Heidegger in “The Question Concerning 
Technology” (though there are traces as far back as the “first mechanized philosopher” 
Nietzsche (Kittler 1999, 200), and the development of the typewriter); a lesson moreover by 
now well-known: namely, that it is not just we who speak and act through language and 
technology, it is also language and technology that speaks and acts through us in a process of 
co-constitution.  What this means is that we need to ask questions about more than how we 
can control, search, find, access, order, structure, mine, map, visualize, graph, audit, interpret, 
analyse and assess vast amounts of cultural data through software tools and techniques and 
approaches drawn from computing science. We also need to devote great care and attention 
to asking questions about how these software tools and computational techniques and 
approaches are controlling, searching, finding, accessing, ordering, structuring, mining, 
mapping, visualizing, graphing, auditing, interpreting, analysing and assessing through, 
around and as part of us.7 And thus how they are involved in the process of constituting and 
organizing our culture and society - and with it our literary and cultural criticism as well as 
our sense of the humanities, humanists and the human - in the twenty-first century.  
 
All of which points to a key problem with the attempt to shift from an interest in the kind of 
critical theories that dominated the humanities for so much of the twentieth century to an 
interest in tools, techniques and methodologies adapted from computer science and related 
fields. For if we do not explicitly do theory - because we either think we have left it behind or 
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relegated it to some as yet unspecified point in the future - we do not end up not doing theory. 
Every methodology contains theory. If we do not explicitly do theory, we end up doing 
simplistic and uninteresting theory that remains blind to the ways it acts as a relay for other 
forces, including those that are part of the general movement in contemporary society 
Lyotard associated with the widespread use of computers and databases and the 
exteriorization of knowledge. As we have seen, it is currently a movement toward STEM 
subjects and away from the humanities; toward a concern to transform knowledge and 
learning into quantities of information and to legitimate power by optimizing the social 
system’s performance in instrumental, functional terms, and away from questions of what is 
just, right and true; and toward an emphasis on openness, efficiency and transparency and 
away, not just from a concern with public service, but also what is capable of disrupting and 
disturbing society and what, in remaining resistant to a culture of measurement and 
calculation, helps to maintain much needed  elements of dissensus, dysfunction, ambiguity, 
conflict,  unpredictability, inaccessibility and inefficiency.  
 
In this respect there is a temptation to agree with those who have insisted Manovich’s 
Cultural Analytics is “unconvincing” (Shanken, 2009). But could we go further? Could we 
say his data-driven cultural research functions as an alibi for an unthought-out and rather 
shallow form of humanities scholarship that has itself been colonized by, and “passionately” 
imitates, the concerns of scientists, businesses, and government agencies (Manovich 2010b)? 
In following “the templates established by the professionals” and marginalizing positions that 
go against this emphasis on instrumentality, does such scholarship constitute merely a 
“further stage in the development of [sic] ‘culture industry’ as analyzed by Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer” (ibid.)? 
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Certainly, as a result of his repeated failure to be rigorously critical and self-reflexive, think 
long and hard about the consequences of considering computers as analytical tools, and ask 
“larger theoretical questions” about contemporary culture and how to make decisions 
regarding what is just and right, it is often difficult to discern how Manovich is doing too 
much more in his Cultural Analytics research than augmenting the power and control of 
States, companies and multinational corporations by using computers and software to 
produce deliverables that can be marketed and sold, not least in exchange for funding. Yet 
one of the things that makes his Cultural Analytics so fascinating, as I read it, is the way it is 
clearly striving to open the humanities to some of the new disciplines, frameworks and forms 
of knowledge that digital media technologies may make possible. So let me conclude this 
attempt to use Cultural Analytics to think through some aspects of the relation between data-
driven scholarship, theory and critique, by taking Manovich at his word and treating his 
stated interest in cultural criticism, theory and self-reflexivity seriously. To return to the 
question with which we began: what might the kind of twenty-first century literary and 
cultural criticism he points us toward - but which at the time of writing he himself apparently 
is as yet unable to enact - actually look like?  
 
 
PART 3: LITERARY AND CULTURAL CRITICISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 
One starting point for speculating on these questions is provided by the artist, writer, theorist 
and fellow participant in the Software Studies Initiative, Eduardo Navas, when he claims that 
Cultural Analytics, as it is practiced by Manovich, “is bringing together qualitative and 
quantitative analysis for the interests of the humanities. In a way Cultural Analytics could be 
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seen as a bridge between specialized fields that in the past have not always communicated 
well” (2009). It is an interpretation that finds support from a recent account of some of ”the 
promises and challenges of big social data” in which Manovich, displaying more signs of 
critical reflection than in much of his Cultural Analytics-related research, comes closest yet to 
articulating what form such a new cultural criticism might actually take. Here, the study of 
culture and society throughout the twentieth century is positioned as having relied on two 
very different kinds of data: 
 
“surface data” about lots of people and “deep data” about the few individuals or small 
groups. The first approach was used in all disciplines that adapted quantitative 
methods (i.e., statistical, mathematical or computational techniques for analyzing 
data). The relevant fields include quantitative schools of sociology, economics, 
political science, communication studies, and marketing research. 
 
The second approach was used in humanities fields such as literary studies, art 
history, film studies, and history… The examples of relevant methods are 
hermeneutics, participant observation, thick description, semiotics, and close reading. 
(Manovich 2012a, 461-462) 
 
However, Manovich sees the rise of social media in the middle of the 2000s, along with 
computational tools able to handle extremely large data sets, as making possible a “new 
paradigm” based on a combination of “quantitative and qualitative approaches” (ibid., 472, 
473). Consequently, no longer must we endeavour to chart a third path between these two 
approaches such as that represented for Manovich by statistics and sampling, enabling 
researchers as they do to “expand certain types of data about the few into the knowledge 
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about the many,” with all the problems attendant on such an expansion (462). Indeed, we do 
not have to “choose between data size and data depth” at all (462-463). Rather, “‘surface is 
the new depth’” (472) in the sense that:  
 
we can use computers to quickly explore massive visual data sets and then select the 
objects for closer manual analysis. While computer-assisted examination of massive 
cultural data sets typically reveals new patterns in this data which even best manual 
“close reading” would miss – and of course, even an army of humanists will not be 
able to carefully “close read” massive data sets in the first place – a human is still 
needed to make sense of these patterns. (468-469) 
 
Encouraged by this line of argument, it is tempting to imagine all we need to do to 
resolve the situation facing literary and cultural criticism in the twenty-first century is find a 
means of marrying the quantitative methodologies and cultural analysis characteristic of 
Manovich’s research, along with the necessary “expertise in computer science, statistics, and 
data mining” he sees humanities researchers as typically lacking (470), with the kind of 
rigorous theoretical critique and self-reflexivity he maintains should also be a part of any 
Cultural Analytics study. We should proceed with care, however. For once embarked on this 
path, we are likely to find ourselves confronted by a variation on a problem I have detailed 
elsewhere (Hall, 2002): that it is not necessarily possible to enhance the performative 
theoretical interpretations that have long been a prominent feature of the humanities with the 
kind of positivistic, empirical methodologies and “tools of quantitative analysis often found 
in the hard sciences” (Navas 2009). It is not possible for the simple reason that these different 
approaches to culture and society do not ‘complement’ each other, as Cohen and Gibbs have 
it (D. Cohen 2010b), but rather remain incommensurable - not least because the dialectical 
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impulse to combine theoretical critique with empirical and quantitative analysis is itself a 
quite traditional one that theory has in many of its guises worked hard to challenge.8  
 
To be clear, this incommensurability does not mean these “specialized fields” are incapable 
of communicating or interacting: only that they are not able to do so quite as smoothly and 
straightforwardly as Manovich and others imply. It means they cannot be married, merged or 
synthesized, for example (D. Cohen 2010a; Drucker 2012, 87; Navas 2009); that “human 
ability to understand and interpret – which computers can’t completely match yet - and 
computers’ ability to analyze massive data sets using algorithms we create,” cannot be simply 
combined (Manovich 2012a, 469). But what it also means is that any rigorous attempt to 
think these approaches together needs to begin by explicitly recognizing the 
incommensurable nature of their relation and thematizing it accordingly. We can thus see that 
far more time and care needs to be spent on how any such communication can be achieved 
between the respective partners in this impossible relationship than has been devoted to it so 
far. 
 
This is where the lack of rigorous attention on Manovich’s part to some of the theories that 
dominated the humanities for much of the twentieth century is felt most keenly. 
 For certainly Marxism, post-Marxism, psychoanalysis and deconstruction are in their 
different ways all capable of providing a potential means, not of reconciling the kind of 
“deep,” close reading and self-reflexive theoretical critique that has been so important to the 
humanities with the “surface,” quantitative analysis and empirical methodologies more 
readily associated with the sciences and social sciences, but of producing a consciously 
developed theory of their incompatibility. Such a theory might even be capable of showing 
how they can both be practiced at the same time, as two incommensurable positions, in an 
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irresolvable yet productive tension, so that the questions, issues and approaches specific to 
each are capable of generating new findings, insights and realisations in the other - to the 
point where both of their identities are brought into question. For the process of developing 
such a theory would involve more than merely negotiating the difficult relationship between 
the two: co-switching emphasis and attention from one to the other and back again, as 
appropriate. It would not be a case of shifting the epistemological ground so that (in the 
words of some of those who have also been critical of the computational turn toward data-led 
methodologies and who have made a case for the continuing importance of the traditional 
humanities to the digital humanities), the humanities can push back culturally, as well as 
intellectually, “against the dominant models of a kind of quantitative and empirical 
approach,” and regain some of their confidence in what they do (Drucker 2010).9 Nor of 
performing quantitative statistical modelling and analysis in a less naïve and more 
sophisticated manner than has been carried out by many digital humanists to date, with more 
emphasis being placed on modelling conditions and probabilities than on counting things. 
Nor even of harnessing “digital toolkits in the service of the Humanities’ core methodological 
strengths: attention to complexity, medium specificity, historical context, analytical depth, 
critique and interpretation” (Schnapp and Presner 2011). Instead, the development of such a 
theory would require opening literary and cultural criticism to disciplines, frameworks and 
forms of knowledge that are neither close nor distant in their reading practices (Moretti 
2000), methodological nor theoretical, quantitative nor qualitative, deep nor surface, digital 
nor traditional humanities - nor “humanistic,” nor “human,” for that matter (Burdick et al 
2012, 135, 82).10 Rather, they would be, in the words of one twentieth-century commitment 
to theory, “something else besides;” something that challenges the conventional distinctions 
between them and, in so doing, “contests the terms and territories of both” (Bhabha 1994, 
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28). What we might perhaps begin to think of as being not just post-digital but post-
humanities too.11 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Such misrecognition is not confined to computing science. As Jacques Derrida points out, 
that a given field cannot understand itself and its founding object because of the transcendent 
position occupied by that object is a “general structure” (2002, 109). Furthermore, and as I 
have shown elsewhere, it is a general structure that also applies to humanists and their 
understanding of the human (Hall 2012). If there is any privilege to be granted the humanities 
over computing science in this respect, it rests with the fact that, while the latter has reflected 
on its own status as a science and profession (Mahoney, 2011), the former have traditionally 
provided the means by which the university thinks both itself, and the identity and 
relationship of the different professional fields within it. It is a self-questioning role that has 
been assigned in the UK to English literature and elsewhere to philosophy. 
 
2  I say “in part” because interestingly, given what I argue below about incommensurability in 
the humanities, science for Lyotard is a “model of an ‘open system’”, in that its pragmatics 
also provide for “dissension” , unpredictability and moves that disturb and destabilize the 
accepted consensus (1986, 61, 64). Hence his interest in chaos theory and fractal 
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mathematics, and the emphasis he places at the end of The Postmodern Condition on 
“differential or imaginative or paralogical activity” whose function is to point out “science’s 
presuppositions” and to persuade those involved to “accept different ones” (65). Paralogy, for 
Lyotard, is thus a form of legitimation “played in the pragmatics of knowledge” (61), 
admissible because it can “generate ideas”’ (65), but distinguishable from innovation on the 
basis the latter is “under the command of the system, or at least used by it to improve its 
efficiency” (61). As such, paralogy enables Lyotard to outline a politics that respects both the 
“desire for the unknown” (67), and “an idea and value of justice that is not linked to that of 
consensus” (66).   
 
3 As Kirschenbaum writes: “Whatever else it might be then, the digital humanities today is 
about a scholarship (and a pedagogy) that is publicly visible in ways to which we are 
generally unaccustomed... Isn’t that something you want in your English department?” (2012, 
9). 
 
4  This is one explanation why many exponents of the computational turn appear to display 
such little awareness of the research of “critical media scholars (like Matthew Fuller, Wendy 
Chun, McKenzie Wark and many others) and hacker activists of the past decade; research 
that has shown again and again how these very formalisms [that is “the ‘quantitative’ 
formalisms of databases and programming”] are ‘qualitative,’ i.e. designed by human groups 
and shaped by cultural, economical and political interests through and through” (Cramer 
2009). However, it also suggests that those who have called for the development of a more 
critically engaged digital humanities – informed by the discussions at #transformDH: 
Transformative Digital Humanities: Doing Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexuality and Class in 
DH, for example (http://transformdh.org/ ) – may be missing the point. 
 
5 Lest this aspect of my analysis appear somewhat unfair, I should stress the ongoing 
discussion over how the digital humanities are to be defined and understood does feature a 
number of critics of the turn toward techniques and methodologies derived from computer 
science who have made a case for the continuing importance of the traditional, theoretically 
informed humanities. See, in their different ways, not just Higgin (2010) and Liu (2012), but 
also Drucker (2010; 2012) and Fitzpatrick (2010).  
 
For an analysis that draws attention to some of the elements of misrecognition that are in turn 
to be found in such a traditional, theoretically informed humanism, see what follows, 
including my conclusion; and also Hall (2011). 
 
6 Hayles positions Manovich’s cultural analytics as a “frontier of knowledge construction” in 
the humanities (2012, 77). Similarly, in a version of “Where is Cultural Criticism” presented 
at the 2011 MLA convention, Liu positions the Cultural Analytics of Lev Manovich and 
Jeremy Douglass as treating “digital materials on the scale of corpuses, databases, distributed 
repositories, and so on–some of the specialties of the digital humanities–[as] ipso facto 
cultural phenomena” in a manner much of the digital humanities could learn from (Liu 2011).  
 
7 In other words, it is not just the objects of knowledge that the big data phenomenon and the 
social theory that goes with it are changing (boyd and Crawford 2011); it us as human 
subjects, too. For instance, would further investigation not be capable of revealing at least 
some aspects of data-driven research as falling into the category of biopolitics: “the 
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endeavour, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to 
governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings 
constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race” (Foucault 1977, 73). 
After all, thanks to social media, “for the first time, we can follow imaginations, opinions, 
ideas, and feelings of hundreds of millions of people” (Manovich 2012a, 461). 
 
8 Wendy Brown, Judith Butler and Jean-Laplanche, in a passage that was collaboratively 
written, albeit unintentionally so, put it this way: “Theory is not simply different from 
description; rather, it is incommensurate with description” (Brown, 2005, 80-81). 
9 For a variation on this theme, see Lovink’s argument that: 
 
Digital humanities, with its one-sided emphasis on data visualization, working with 
computer-illiterate humanities scholars as innocent victims, has so far made a bad 
start in this respect. We do not need more tools; what’s required are large research 
programs run by technologically informed theorists that finally put critical theory in 
the driver’s seat. The submissive attitude in the arts and humanities towards the hard 
sciences and industries needs to come to an end. (Lovink 2012) 
 
10 For more on the misrecognition of the human in the humanities, see n.1 as well as Hall 
(2011; 2012). 
 
11 According to Cramer, the era of the “post-digital” has already begun. It is “an age where, 
on the one hand, ‘digital’ has become a meaningless attribute because almost all media are 
electronic and based on digital information processing; and where, on the other hand, 
younger generation media-critical artists rediscover analog information technology” (Cramer 
2012).  
